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 Abbreviations  
 
$-United States. Dollars 
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GHG- Greenhouse Gases 
IMF-International Monetary Fund 
IPCC- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
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Introduction 
The great danger of confronting peak oil and global warming…[is that] we 
will plunge after ‘solutions’ that will make our problems even worse.-Jeff Gödel, 
Rolling Stone Magazine 
 
 
 
In 2006, a militant group gained power in the Niger Delta, an oil-rich area 
in Nigeria: MEND.  MEND asserted itself as a force by blowing up pipelines and 
kidnapping oil-workers.  Typical media coverage of MEND portrayed members 
as terrorists and guerrillas.1  One particular article in Vanity Fair described 
MEND as, “a collection of walking nightmares, everything…terrifying to the 
human psyche…” (Junger, 2007).  What made MEND “terrifying” was their 
unique use of force and willingness to kill.  Unlike many groups, MEND does not 
claim to want their “fair” share of oil revenue-they want control over the land.  
                                                
1 Cf. Crude Tactics in The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2006; Nigeria’s Deadly 
Days in Time Magazine, May 14, 2006. 
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After one attack in 2007 a MEND spokesperson sent out a warning to all foreign 
oil workers, writing that they should “leave our land while you can or die in it. 
Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export 
oil” (Junger, 2007).  MEND had declared war on foreign oil companies. 
That same year, across the world quite a different war on foreign oil was 
being declared.  In his 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared 
that: “America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of 
the world.”  To end this addiction, Bush then introduced his Advanced Energy 
Initiative: a push towards energy that would be clean, renewable, and 
emphatically national.  America, as the world’s largest oil consumer, was fighting 
what it perceived as intolerable oil prices-prices that have continued to climb.  
Gavin Bridge stated that Bush’s statement indicates that oil is a producer’s 
market, and that this is a “startling admission given the [U.S.] invasion of one of 
the world’s major producers and the continued massive [U.S.] military 
deployment in the Middle East” (G. Bridge, pers. Comm.., May 1, 2008).  In other 
words the consumer had lost all control over the price of a commodity. 
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 Souece: EIA 
 From Nigeria to the White House, 2006 seemed to illuminate doomsday: 
peak oil had arrived.  By peak oil I am referring to a peak in both oil prices and an 
actual peak in world-wide oil reserves.2   Both wars were not just about the price 
of oil, but were also responses to the environmental degradation caused by its use.  
Members of MEND have seen their surroundings destroyed by oil extraction, 
which has brought with it an erosion of livelihood strategies and a slew of health 
problems.  At the same time, America’s purported addiction to oil has helped 
produce anthropogenic climate change.  In their fourth assessment on climate 
change, the IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers (2007) plainly stated that, 
                                                
2 For material on peak oil reserves and production c.f.  The Next Oil Crisis Looms 
Large-and Perhaps Close and Predicting the Next Peak in World Oil Production. 
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“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal.”  The IPCC also concluded that 
CO2 is the most important atmospheric gas driving current climate change, and 
that the primary source of all CO2 emissions is the burning of fossil fuels by 
humans (IPCC, 2007).  Projected effects of climate change range from massive 
droughts to the complete melting of the polar ice caps, all of which either directly 
or indirectly affect humans (IPCC, 2007).  It has become accepted globally that 
reliance on fossil fuels must end to prevent more extensive climate change.   
 The 2007 IPCC report effectively ended the debate on whether or not 
climate change was occurring; however, over a decade earlier the United Nations 
formed an international treaty on climate change, UNFCCCC, which encouraged 
the reduction of GHG.  The treaty was unfortunately unenforceable, and failed to 
reduce global GHG emissions.  Thus, UNFCCCC member countries began 
negotiations of a new international treaty, which committed member countries to 
reducing their national GHG through a measure called a protocol.3   The Kyoto 
Protocol became adopted by member counties in December of 1997, but was not 
entered into force until February of 2005.4  A major goal of the Kyoto Protocol 
was for major industrial countries to reduce their GHG emissions, and for 
member countries to communally cut global GHG by just over 5% of the 1990 
                                                
3 http://UNFCCCc.int/essential_background/items/2877.php 
4 http://UNFCCCc.int/essential_background/items/2877.php 
6 
 
baseline.5  However, Kyoto has been fraught with many failures (addressed in 
chapter three)  
I argue that the findings of the IPCC and the sheer existence of the Kyoto 
Protocol demonstrate how peak oil and climate change are interrelated, addressing 
one problem necessitates addressing the other.  Together peak oil and climate 
change constitute what I refer to here as the ‘global problem.’  This thesis seeks to 
go beyond conventional understandings of the above mentioned wars on oil in 
order to draw out the material linkages between the United States and Nigeria, 
and demonstrate that these linkages are important for both understanding and 
addressing the current global problem.6  More specifically, my research aims to 
understand the array of recent responses to the global problem by different social 
groups, to theorize their underlying assumptions, and ultimately explain the 
                                                
5 http://UNFCCCc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
6 In response to a presentation based on this paper, Gavin Bridge responded, 
“What are the material connections between Nigerian extraction and the U.S.?” 
Material connections could be interpreted as: power relations-the flows of capital 
or perhaps the lifecycle of the carbon atom itself.  By material connections, I 
specifically mean the global contradictions that are produced, reproduced, and 
made more complex due to the global capitalism. (G. Bridge, personal 
communication, May 1, 2008). 
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reasons for their utter failure to adequately address these issues.  My starting point 
is the political economy of oil.7  More narrowly, I study the contradictions within 
and between oil production and consumption as a dialectical whole.  On the 
production side, I have examined what has led to the rise of MEND, and on the 
consumption side I consider America’s attempt to find an alternative fuel through 
the case study E85.   The key questions that have framed my research are: how 
are socioeconomic stratification and environmental degradation interrelated?  And 
how have societies’ conceptions of nature facilitated the current problem?  As I 
will argue, capitalism has both aided in the creation of the global problem, and 
simultaneously prevented it from being addressed in a meaningful way.  The root 
of the global problem, are ethical questions of value-value in capitalism, 
capitalism’s valuation of nature, and the representation of these values; all of 
which are problematic. 
 
                                                
7 Kojin Karatani defines political economy as “a science that cannot acknowledge 
the being of an enigma in human exchange” (2005, p. 188).  
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Chapter 1 
Production: Dysfunctional Dualism in Nigeria 
 
In pursuit of their comparative advantage, these nature-exporting nations are 
frequently recast in their old colonial role as sources of primary products, a role 
now rewritten in terms of the neoliberal rationality of globalizing capitalism.  
–Fernando Coronil 
 
Part 1: Introduction 
It has been more than forty years since Nigeria gained its independence 
from Britain.  Despite hopes that the end of colonial rule would improve life, 
living conditions in Nigeria are steadily deteriorating.  On the 2006 Human 
Development Index, a measurement of quality of life produced by the United 
Nations, Nigeria ranked 159th out of 177 countries (p. 317).   
Nigerian Statistics 
 
Population 
(2008) 
 
Life 
Expectancy 
(2008) 
 
Population 
below 
Poverty 
Line 
(2007) 
 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate 
(2008) 
 
Literacy 
(2008) 
 
Population 
Living 
with 
HIV/AIDS 
(2003) 
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138,283,240 
 
47.8 Years 
 
70% 
 
5.4 
children/ 
woman 
 
68% 
 
5.4% 
 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
The Niger Delta region provides a striking example of the multiple failures of the 
independent, neoliberal Nigerian state. 8   Despite vast natural resources and a 
strategic geographic location, the overwhelming majority of Nigerians living in 
the Niger Delta region have no running water, no electricity, and no sanitation 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2006).  These conditions are met with 
                                                
8 Throughout this thesis I refer to neoliberalism to describe an ensemble of the 
political and economic strategies that have become prominent since the 1970s. 
The hallmarks of these strategies are the liberalization of trade, finance, and 
investment on the one hand, and towards privatization of state owned enterprises 
and resources on the other.  Neoliberalism is based on the ideology of liberalism.  
Bob Jessop states that “liberalism claims that economic, political, and social 
relations are best organized through formally free choices of formally free and 
rational actors who seek to advance their own material or ideal interests in an 
institutional framework that, by accident of design, maximizes the scope of 
formally free choice” (2002, p. 453). 
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the presence of foreign oil companies who are seen as extracting money out of the 
Delta region, while leaving behind a devastated environment.  2006 saw the 
emergence of a new militant anti-oil group in the region, MEND.  Unlike 
previous groups of this region, MEND is demanding all foreigners associated with 
oil, including Nigerians not native to the Delta, withdrawal from the region.  A 
BBC news article in 2007 wrote that “the situation [in the Niger Delta region] has 
gone from bad to worse to disastrous recently with the emergence of armed 
militant groups willing to kill as part of their campaign…”  Essentially, MEND 
has declared war within the Niger Delta.   
It is facile and reactionary to classify MEND as a terrorist organization.  I 
therefore propose another interpretation of this organization by arguing that the 
rise of MEND cannot solely be attributed to the presence of foreign oil 
companies.   Broadly, the rise of MEND should be viewed as a result of the 
interplay between the Nigerian government and the neoliberal global economy.  
More narrowly, I argue that MEND should be viewed as a symptom of Nigeria’s 
continually deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions. 
 Within a political-economy perspective, in order to interpret Nigeria we 
should first gain a historical perspective that illuminates the rise of current 
Nigerian state institutions and the country’s place in the global economy.  
Through an analysis of MEND as a symptom, I seek to demonstrate that Nigeria, 
as a whole, is on the brink of collapse.  Unless dramatic change occurs, it is 
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probable that the violence of the Delta region will spread throughout Nigeria, and 
possibly spill into surrounding nations.  On a global level, the emergence of 
MEND should signify the utter failure of neoliberal economics.  
 
Part 2: Nigeria’s Economy  
 Since Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960 its economy has 
operated as what Alain de Janvry described in The Agrarian Question as a 
disarticulated export-enclave economy (1982).  
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Source: de Janvry, 1982 
In disarticulated economies, the modern and traditional sectors existed separately 
from one another (de Janvry, 1982, p. 32).  In export-enclave economies, national 
economic interest is focused on earning capital through the exportation of goods, 
often primary or raw commodities (de Janvry, 1982, p. 32).  This focus on exports 
translates into a lack of national industries, and this in turn means that excess 
capital is reinvested in foreign markets, the purchasing of military weapons by the 
Nigerian government for example.  In Political Economy in Nigeria: The 
Military, Ethnic Politics, and Development author Kelechi Kalu confirms the 
existence of Nigeria’s export-enclave economy by asserting that Nigeria’s 
“existing strategies of economic development reflect the colonial model of 
‘central planning’ and emphasis on export over consumption products” (1996, p. 
231).   As a disarticulated economy, Nigerians of subaltern social groups survive 
under the “functional dualism” between capitalism and peasant agriculture (de 
Janvry, 1982).9  De Janvry characterizes functional dualism as “both a source of 
                                                
9 In his prison notebooks Antonio Gramsci writes that “subaltern classes…are not 
unified and cannot unite until they are able to become the ‘State’” and that 
“subaltern groups are always subject to the ruling of the activity of ruling 
groups…” (p. 54- 55).  The subaltern is a marginalized social class, meaning they 
lack power and do not comprise the State.  However, they are under control of 
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primitive accumulation…and a contradictory process that leads to the destruction 
of the peasantry” (1982, p. 4).  In a disarticulated economy, members of the 
traditional sector are identified as semi-proletarians because they are able to earn 
livelihoods either through subsistence living or as a wage earner.10  A large 
section of Nigerians have literally existed outside the formal economy; this 
population has been surviving mainly through subsistence living.  In the Niger 
Delta, semi-proletarians have historically utilized their natural resources-farms 
and fisheries-to live.  As I will demonstrate, the livelihoods of Nigerians living in 
the Delta are being destroyed by oil activities.   
As an export-enclave economy Nigeria has long relied on the exportation 
of goods to earn capital, thus it is also viewed as a price taker in the global 
economy.  Prior to the 1970s, Nigeria’s exports were mainly agricultural goods.  
However, the oil boom of the 1970s coupled with industrial nations’ reliance on 
oil has shifted the focus of Nigerian exports and has allowed for the dominance of 
                                                                                                                                   
State power meaning that subaltern classes are integrated into the overall 
hegemonic society.  
10 In Capital Vol. 1, Marx defines a proletarian as a person whose only means to 
survive is by selling their labor power in capitalism.  A semi-proletarian is a 
person who mediates between selling their labor power and subsistence living, 
meaning that they are not fully participatory in the capitalist system.  
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oil.  This focus on oil has been accompanied with a decline in the overall 
agricultural sector.  Switching from an economy focused on agricultural goods to 
oil has simultaneously eroded subsistence living.  This phenomenon is largely 
visible in the form of mass migration from rural areas into urban centers.  Lagos, 
for example, has seen its population explode from 300,000 in 1950 to >10 million 
in 2004 (Davis, 2006, p. 26).  
 
Part 3: Colonial Nigeria 
 Although the history of Nigeria certainly does not begin with British 
colonialism, the colonial experience forms the critical starting place for 
understanding many contemporary problems.  Although Lagos became a British 
colony in 1861, it was not until 1914 that Britain unified what are today the 
southern and northern regions of Nigeria in the creation of one country (Kalu, 
1996, p. 248).  This macro-level unification did not translate into unification at 
regional or local levels.  Instead, it laid the groundwork for a fractured society.  
Under colonial rule, Nigeria remained fragmented into three distinct regions: 
northern, western, and southern.  The geography of Nigeria under British rule can 
largely be seen as the basis for Nigeria’s current political and economic failures 
(Mbabuika, 2005, p. 203).  It is no exaggeration to say that Nigeria was created by 
the British to serve British purposes; thus, the very foundation of Nigeria in a 
theoretical sense can be viewed as illegitimate. Fragmenting Nigeria into three 
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distinct parts prevented unification of Nigerian society, which aided Britain in its 
colonial rule over Nigeria.  Instead of unification, each region was comprised of 
distinct ethnic groups with one or two groups as the dominant power of that 
region, and this still largely exists today: Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the 
west and Igbo in the east.  This has translated into deep, long-standing ethnic 
competition and conflict within Nigeria.11 Today, the Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa and 
Fulani remain the political and economic elite, while the ethnic groups of the 
Niger Delta remain marginalized (O’Neill, 2007, p. 2). 
Although the oil industry began under colonialism, during this time 
Nigeria mainly exported tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil.  As with 
many other colonized nations, colonialism left Nigeria dependent on the 
exportation of raw commodities to industrial nations.  Kelechi Kalu emphasizes 
this point writing that, “the emphasis on cash crops in colonial Nigeria cannot be 
overemphasized for its relevance to the current economic problem” (1996, p. 
231).   Additionally, during colonialism foreign companies were given 
competitive advantages.  This helped prevent and delay the rise of Nigerian 
industries after Nigerian independence.  This situation can most clearly be seen in 
Nigeria’s oil industry.  While under colonial rule oil was first discovered in the 
village of Oloibiri (O’Neill, 2007, p. 4).  The dominance of foreign oil companies 
can largely be attributed to the fact that the oil industry began in Nigeria under 
                                                
11 See http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/histroy.html 
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colonial rule.  Royal Dutch Shell, today known as the Shell Corporation, was of 
Dutch and British origin.  Despite nationalization of the oil industry in 1971, Shell 
continues to be a dominant force in Nigeria.  In 1999 Nigeria was producing 
approximately 2.25 million barrels of crude oil per day, and Shell had a 39.58% 
share of total crude oil production in Nigeria (Frynas, 2000, p. 414).12  Shell also 
has rights to 43,052 sq. km of land, which is 19% of all oil licenses and leases 
(Frynas, 2000, p.721).  To contrast this, NNPC has rights to only 690 sq. km of 
land. 
Upon independence, Nigerian society collapsed into civil war.  
Competition to control the oil industry by different ethnic groups has been cited 
as a reason for the civil war.  Although history has seen Nigeria transform from 
colonial rule to authoritarian rule to its current form of authoritarian democracy, 
conflict to control oil remains at the heart of political and economic instability and 
conflict. At the end of colonialism, Nigeria inherited weak state institutions, and 
largely failed to build its own. Nigeria inherited its present-day institutions from 
British rule, institutions which have been determined inappropriate for social 
renewal (Szeftel, p. 431). This inappropriateness has translated into a country in 
which the overwhelming majorities of citizens are excluded from economic power 
and view their government as corrupt. 
 
                                                
12 The figure 2.25 million barrels per day is from EIA’s Nigeria Energy Profile.   
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Part 4: Today’s Economy 
Nigeria’s economy remains reliant on oil. Oil accounts for 95% of its 
export earnings and 80% of total government revenue (Watts, 2004, p. 50).  For 
the majority of Nigerians life in Nigeria remains short and bleak.  In Nigeria a 
very small percentage, approximately 1%, of the population earns an income from 
the oil industry (Junger, 2007).  State revenue earned from oil is distributed solely 
by the Federal government.  According to the Nigerian constitution, a little less 
than 50% of total governmental oil revenue is distributed to state and local 
governments, with an additional 13% of the revenue to the nine-states that 
comprise the Niger Delta (Junger, 2007).  This means that oil revenue is filtered 
down to local populations through a corrupt, authoritarian state structure.  
Vast sums of money are often stolen or misappropriated for personal use.  
Since 1960 out of $270 billion earned from oil, $50 billion has simply vanished 
(Watts, 2004, p. 51).  A former military ruler, Sani Abache, hid nearly $3 billion 
in foreign banks (BBC, 2000).  Even though the overwhelming majority of oil 
being extracted solely comes from the Niger Delta region, these communities lack 
control over this resource.  Nigeria’s nationalization of the oil industry can be 
viewed as elites seizing and consolidating state power. 
The oil boom that took place during 1970s gave Nigeria a false sense of 
achievement; during this time revenue earned from oil was seen as the indicator 
of Nigeria’s development both nationally and internationally (Gandy, p. 381). 
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Even with the oil boom of the 1970s, by 1985 the Nigerian government had 
borrowed $19.1 billion in its efforts to implement a national development plan 
(Kalu, 1996, p.234).  By 1986 Nigeria’s economy seemed on the brink of 
collapse, and the government was unable to procure additional credit from 
international financial institutions (Dibua, 2006, p. 252).  Predictably, Nigeria 
signed a SAP with the IMF in July 1986 (Dibua, 2006, p. 252).  The SAP failed to 
improve Nigeria’s economy, and today their debt portfolio is around $30 billion.  
All of this led to much failure of the national Nigerian industrial sector, which at 
the time was in its infant stage. 
Under neoliberalism, the global economy has become dominated by 
market forces.  Thus, Nigeria’s position in the unequal global economy means 
that it is largely at the hands of banks, transnational corporations, and state elites.  
The rise of neoliberal policies has translated into an increase of worldwide 
disparity. In Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?, Robert Wade 
asserts that the “most striking feature” about GNPs since the 1970s has been the 
size of gaps between developed and peripheral countries (2004, p. 384).  Wade 
also concludes that despite the claim that neoliberal policies will reduce poverty, 
“world inequality…is probably rising” (2004, p. 400).  Finally the figures for sub-
Saharan Africa in the 2005 Millennium Development Goals Report showed that 
from 1990 to 2001 the following had occurred: an increase in the number of 
people living on less than a dollar a day, an increase in the number of annual 
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AIDS related deaths, and a growth in the number of people living in slums (2005, 
p. 364-393).  
 
Part 5: Geopolitics and Nigerian Oil 
 One of the major events that shaped politics in modern day Nigeria was 
the civil war that took place from 1967 to 1970 (Frynas, 2001, p. 30).  Prior to the 
civil war, Nigeria functioned through semi-autonomous regions.  At the end of the 
civil war, Nigeria devolved into 12 states (presently 36) all under the control of a 
centralized state government based in Lagos (Frynas, 2001, p. 30).  The 
centralization of power into the government was met with and derived by the 
centralization of oil.  During the oil boom of the 1970s, several important federal 
actions took place signaling that the priority of the Nigerian government was the 
oil industry.  In 1971 the Nigerian government nationalized the oil industry, today 
known as NNPC (Frynas, 2001, p. 30).  Nationalization of the oil industry meant 
that state officials became, effectively, the sole decision-makers (Frynas, 2001, p. 
30).  Additionally, the NNPC was created in partnership with foreign oil 
companies; such a relationship ensures that the government acts with foreign oil 
interests mind (Frynas, 2001, p. 30).  For example, in the joint-venture between 
Shell and NNPC, as of 1993 NNPC had a 55% share (Frynas, 2000, p. 416).  In 
1978 the government enacted The Land Use Act which shifted landownership 
into possession of state governors and provided government sanctity to evict 
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inhabitants (Frynas, 2001, p. 30).  The Nigerian government has been constructed 
in a way to meet oil needs, not the needs of Nigerian society.  Finally, Nigeria is 
presently one of the lowest-cost sites for oil extraction, thus making it attractive to 
transnational oil companies (Zalik, 2004, p. 404). 
 The Nigerian government has been internationally condemned as corrupt. 
In 2000 Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt country in the world by 
Transparency International (BBC, 2000)13.  Corruption in Nigeria is widely seen 
as the result of oil.14 Indeed oil does not just dominate economic life it also 
dominates politics in Nigeria. Politics of Nigeria have been categorized as 
“authoritarian governmentality” and “petro-capitalist” (Gandy, 2006, p. 373). 
Whichever term is used to discern the authentic meaning of Nigerian politics, the 
reality is that the Nigerian government operates with corporate oil interests, not 
the livelihoods of its citizens, in mind (Gandy, 2006, p. 373).   
                                                
13 Transparency International, a Berlin-based NGO that tracks state corruption, 
corruption is defined as an abuse of power for private gain. 
14 Much has been written about the connections between oil and the Nigerian 
state. C.f. Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria by Tom Forrest (1995); 
Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta by Ike 
Okonta & Douglass Oronto (2001); and, State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria by 
Michael Watts (1987).  
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Nevertheless, corruption within Nigerian politics should not be viewed as 
the sole result of oil; nor should it be viewed that corruption is unique to Nigeria. 
As author Morris Szeftel writes, “One reason corruption has been so destructive 
and resilient in post-colonial Africa is because of the forms taken by clientelism 
and its importance for local capital accumulation and class formation” (2000, p. 
429).  In Nigeria, clientelism has meant that ‘democratic’ leaders have not been 
elected by their stances on political issues, but on their ability to distribute 
economic ‘gifts’.15  Clientelism allows for the mobilization of marginalized 
groups, but only in context of unequal relations with those in power (Szeftel, p. 
434).  Thus, clientelism allows for a false sense of empowerment to marginalized 
groups, while upholding and reinforcing unequal power relations. Widening gaps 
of inequality and the interests of oil companies only exacerbate these conditions.  
In 1999 Nigeria transitioned from authoritarian rule to democratic rule under 
President Olusegun Obasanjo (Lewis, 2003, p. 131).  Despite transitioning to 
democratic rule, the presence of clientelism has only aggravated political 
corruption.  Under these conditions the vast majority of Nigerians have come to 
view their government as dishonest and dismiss the entire political system. 
Today, the oil companies and the state collaborate for their mutual benefit. 
In 1996 it was discovered that Shell had imported arms for the Nigerian police 
(Okeagu, 2006, 2006, p. 210).  The oil companies argue that employing police is 
                                                
15 In Nigeria, clientelism takes the form of relationships built on patronage. 
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necessary to ensure the protection of their workers, but the truth is that they use 
the police to suppress anti-oil activism.  In 1990 a Shell manager made a written 
request for ‘protection’ from the Mobile Force, a notoriously brutal Nigerian 
military force.  The Mobile Force then in turned killed eight unarmed civilians 
and destroyed one hundred homes (Okeagu, 2006, 2006, p. 211).  More than 15 
years later, Shell remains a prevailing force in the Niger Delta and continues to 
employ the Mobile Police.  The ability of oil companies and the Nigerian state to 
use violence is best explained by Nicos Poulantzas’s statement that “in a class-
divided society, it is always the State, as the practitioner of legitimate violence 
and physical repression, which takes precedence over law” (1978, p. 85).  In the 
Delta region Shell largely acts as the defacto state; basic services such as 
transportation and education in the region are both regulated and controlled by 
Shell (Zalik, 2004, p. 406).  
Socio-economic crises in the Niger Delta have disrupted the oil industry, 
and in response oil companies have enacted various development plans; Shell’s 
current tactic is “Sustainable Community Development” (Zalik, 2004, p. 408). 
These latest plans are a continuation of the previous model called “Community 
Development” (Zalik, 2004, p. 412). Although community development projects 
are supposed to be built on partnerships with local actors, these projects merely 
promoted non-confrontational and respectful negotiations between local 
23 
 
authorities and Shell (Zalik, 2004, p. 409). The development plans created by 
Shell, similarly to clientelism, only strengthen unequal relations.  
By allowing the oil companies to enact development plans, the Nigerian 
government has further de-legitimized itself in the Niger Delta.  Nigerian expert 
Michael Watts asserts that the Niger Delta was the “epicenter of voting fraud in 
the April 2003 elections” (Watts, 2004, p. 51).  The May 29, 2007 presidential 
elections ‘won’ by Umaru Yar’Adua only demonstrates the continual 
deterioration of any notion of a democratic Nigerian government.  An article in 
The Economist described the elections as “so badly run and marred by such 
widespread rigging [that] they lacked even a pretense of democratic plausibility” 
(2007).  Yar’Adua’s presidency is not being accepted, and is seen as a mere 
continuation of Obasanjo’s rule and power (Ibid).  Despite former President 
Obasanjo’s claims that his presidency would end political corruption and improve 
conditions in Nigeria, little changed and today 70% of Nigerians are living on less 
than a dollar a day (Economist, 2007, p. 56).  
 
Part 6: Life in the Niger Delta 
Today the gross domestic product per capita in Nigeria is only $1,154 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2006).  With the majority of wealth 
concentrated in the hands of a few, for the majority of Nigerians this figure is 
actually much lower.  Over half of the population is living without access to 
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improved water sources (Ibid).  The life expectancy for Nigerians is only 43.4 
years; to put this into perspective, the life expectancy in Japan is almost double at 
82.2 years (Ibid).  Life in the Niger Delta region is particularly brutal.  Life exists 
under conditions which Watts has coined “petro-violence;” a society in which 
protest over the oil industry is mitigated through the usage of force by both the 
Nigerian military and oil companies (Zalik, 2004, p. 401).  At the same time, 
livelihoods in the Delta are being threatened and destroyed.  Until 1988 there was 
no federal environmental agency overseeing the oil companies’ activities impact 
on the region (O’Neill, 2005, p. 5).  For the oil companies, this has allowed for 
cheap oil extraction, but for the people living in the Delta it has meant acid rain, 
deadly explosions, crop failure, respiratory diseases, collapse of the fishing 
industry, and the destruction of private property (O’Neill, p. 5).  On average 
Nigeria has 300 oil spills per year (Watts, 2004, p. 69).  Nigeria’s lack of a natural 
gas infrastructure has meant that 75% of this gas is simply burned off, known as 
gas flares (Okeagu, 2006, p. 202).  Gas flares are not only dangerous, but in 
Nigeria these flares have produced millions of tons of both methane and CO2 
(Watts, 2004, p. 69).  The authors of The Environmental and Social Impact of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Exploitation In Nigeria best synopsize the problem of 
gas flares: 
It is pathetic that at a time when more than 19,000 people have died in 
Europe because of global warming that results in the greenhouse effect, 
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flaring of natural gas is still being carried out in Nigeria (Okeagu, 2006, 
p.202).  
 Problems of the Delta region have filtered out negatively impacting 
Nigeria as a whole.  A large example of this is the massive migration into urban 
cities previously mentioned.  An increased population in urban areas has in turn 
caused a dramatic increase in the number of people, who were once able to live by 
subsistence means, who must now gain capital in order to purchase commodities 
for their survival.  By and large these people lack access to formal means of 
income, and again this is largely tied to the dominance of oil and lack of national 
industries.  This lack of access has thus meant that large numbers of people must 
operate outside the formal sector in illegal or informal sectors 
. Nigeria can no longer be seen as operating under de Janvry’s functional 
dualism, for its subaltern class can no longer even survive. The vast majority of 
Nigerians who find themselves excluded from the formal political and economic 
structures have no other choice but to operate in informal often deemed illegal 
sectors.  Exclusion from the formal sectors forces citizens to turn to alternatives-
oil bunkering for example.16  As global demand for oil increases, driven 
                                                
16 Bunkering is the illegal siphoning off of oil, and this oil is then sold for highly 
profitable amounts of money on underground markets (Okeagu, 2006, p. 208). 
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increasingly from China, it is unlikely that the conditions of the Delta region will 
improve.  
 Nigeria’s lack of control over the foreign oil companies has only 
compounded the environmental and social problems attributed to oil.  With no 
ramifications, oil companies have no consideration for long-term environmental 
consequences or how they affect local communities.  For example, the large 
volumes of polluted water that are produced through pumping oil out of the 
ground are recycled into the subsurface (Okeagu, 2006, p. 202).  For the oil 
companies this enhances oil recovery.  However, once the land is no longer used 
for oil extraction there is concern about how this polluted water may adversely 
affect living and/or agricultural production on such lands (Okeagu, 2006, p. 202). 
Environmental degradation has meant that many residents of the Delta region can 
no longer live through subsistence means, which is seen as a push factor driving 
migration into urban centers (Okeagu, 2006, p. 204).  The Land Use Act of 1978 
has compounded these forces pushing Delta residents off their lands (Omeje, 
2005, p. 324).  
 
Part 7: A Re-examination of MEND 
 We may now return to MEND to examine this social movement.  While 
one may view MEND as anomalous, I conclude that MEND reflects only the 
evolution of anti-oil activism in the Niger Delta.  This evolution can be traced 
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back to November 10, 1995, when civil rights leader Ken Saro-Wiwa was hung 
by the Nigerian government after being convicted of murder charges-charges 
viewed internationally as erroneous (Junger, 2007).  Saro-Wiwa was the leader of 
the non-violent, anti-Shell organization MOSOP (Junger, 2007).  MOSOP 
advocated for local control over the oil industry, equitable distribution of oil 
revenue, and greater resources devoted to both environmental clean-up and 
control (Okeagu, 2006, p. 207).  Saro-Wiwa’s unjustified death can in hindsight 
be viewed as the end of non-violence as a viable method for anti-oil activism.  
Although MEND has taken on a starkly different form from MOSOP and is 
affiliated with a different ethnic group, the Ijaw, they have adopted much of the 
same ideology (Junger, 2007).  Until the emergence of MEND, existing groups in 
were viewed as less interested in ideology than in money.  Yet, MEND wants 
sovereignty over land that they view as theirs.  It is this paper’s conclusion that 
MEND should be viewed as an expression of frustration.  Watts’ assessment of 
modern day Africa articulates the social formation behind MEND: 
Across Africa you have a huge number of alienated youths, politically 
footloose, who thought they could achieve something with the countries’ 
moves to independence and democracy.  Those hopes have been almost 
everywhere been violently snuffed out.  The youth are pissed off and 
willing to up the ante (2004). 
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To conclude, I argue that the situation in the Niger Delta indicates that what de 
Janvry described as functional dualism is no longer functional: the reproduction 
of labor-power has been stifled largely due to mass-migration out of the region, 
and at the same time the conflict taking place intervenes in national capitalist 
accumulation by disrupting the oil industry’s ability to export.  Essentially, 
Nigeria is in transition from functional to dysfunctional dualism.  Neoliberal 
policies failed to bring developmental progress to Nigeria, and they instead have 
lead to an escalation of poverty, disparity, and violence.  The rise of MEND 
should be viewed as an important indicator of the multiple failures of 
neoliberalism, and more broadly the contradictions of global capitalism. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Consumption: Fueling Contradictions in the United States 
“Green is the color of mold and corruption.”-James Lovelock 
 
 
Part 1: America, Oil, and Cars 
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 Presently in the United States there are over one-hundred million 
passenger cars on the road, and this number continually grows.  When 
motorcycles, trucks, and all other vehicles are accounted for the above figure 
soars to well over two-hundred million. The majority of all these vehicles run on 
only one fuel: petroleum.17  In Fortune Magazine’s 2007 list of the 500 largest 
American companies, the criteria for which is partially based on company revenue 
and profits, 6 of the top 10 were either petroleum refining or automobile 
manufacturing industries; three of the top five were Exxon Mobile, Chevron, and 
ConocoPhillips.  Automobile transportation is the backbone for much of 
American society and economy.  In 1974 geographers Richard Walker and David 
Large observed that “…the growth and dominance of automotive transportation 
[has] restructured the entirety of urban life,” and that “the urban [American] 
economy is embodied in the structures built…to transport people and 
commodities” (1975, p. 384).  Today, over 30 years later, this very same economy 
is not only still in existence: it has only grown in size.  With life in the United 
States constructed around automobile use, it is easy to comprehend why the 
majority of top grossing American companies are all a part of the transportation 
                                                
17 According to the United States White House, the transportation sector accounts 
for 2/3 of all U.S. petroleum use (http://www.White 
House.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/energy/index.html).  
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industry.  However, the 2007 IPCC’s assessment of anthropogenic climate change 
determined that fossil fuel usage, a major one being petroleum, is the main source 
of current CO2 emissions.  The IPCC’s report further determined that CO2 is the 
most prevalent greenhouse gas driving current climatic changes (IPCC, 2007).  
Petroleum usage has been further complicated by depleting fossil fuel reserves.  
This depletion has provided evidence for the acceptance that oil production has a 
peak and its usage is finite, both of which are based on M. King Hubbert’s 
curve.18  It has become increasingly clear that American reliance on petroleum is 
no longer a viable option, but at the same time ending dependence on 
transportation is neither practical nor feasible.  This lies at the heart of America’s 
quest for an alternative fuel-a contradictory search that has thus far proven 
fruitless.  
 
Part 2: America’s History of Alternative Fuels and the Case for E85 
 Although the American public may only recently have begun demanding 
an environmentally clean alternative to petroleum, scientists have conducted 
research on the impact of fossil fuel emissions on the environment for decades.  In 
1963 the United States Congress passed the first form of the Clean Air Act, a bill 
                                                
18 M. King Hubbert developed a curve to predict peak oil in 1956, which 
accurately predicted the peak of oil production in the United States.  
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which specifically aimed at mitigating atmospheric pollution.  A specific goal of 
the Act was to reduce air pollution emissions by vehicles.  One outcome of the 
Act was that the auto industry had to design all automobile engines to meet 
specific federal standards.  The 1960s and 1970s saw several other important 
federal Clean Air Acts and amendments, and was seen as an era of strong 
environmental regulation.  The Clean Air Acts of this time period clearly 
demonstrate that regulation of automobile emissions and research into alternative 
fuels is not unique to the current era of peak oil and climate change (Dias de 
Oliveira, 2005, p. 593).  The monumental Clean Air Act of 1990 established a 
national emissions permits program, proposed emissions trading, and had 
additional previsions to address environmental hazards caused by emissions.  The 
emissions program of the 1990 Act is largely the model for current global GHG 
cap-and-trade programs (analyzed in the following chapter).  
 Recently there has been an emphasis on research and development as a 
means to combat GHG and produce technology that will overcome the limits of 
peak oil.  According to the White House, since 2001 President George W. Bush’s 
administration had spent over $10 billion on research and development into 
alternatives to petroleum, and Bush’s 2006 Advanced Energy Initiative pledged to 
increase that amount by 22% (Bush, 2006).  Currently, the DOE recognizes ten 
different automobile fuels: gasoline, no. 2 gasoline, biodiesel, CNG, electricity, 
E85, hydrogen, liquefied natural gas, LPG, and methanol.  All of these fuels are 
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derived from different sources, have different availabilities, and different energies 
per gallon.  While gasoline is produced from only one source-oil- fuels like E85 
have multiple sources.  Today in the U.S., biofuel-specifically corn based E85-is 
one of the most prominent alternative fuels.  President Bush’s 2005 National 
Energy Policy specifically required the usage of 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol, and 
provided tax credits for the instillation of alternative fuel stations (Bush, 2006).  
While conventional gasoline can be blended with other types of fuel, it is 
limited to a maximum of 10% blending with renewable fuels.  E85 is a specific 
hybrid fuel that is comprised of 85% ethanol and 15% conventional gasoline. 
Ethanol can be obtained through the sugars of a variety of plants, but 90% of 
current ethanol production comes from corn.19   According to the EIA, “The most 
commonly used processes [to derive ethanol] today [uses] yeast to ferment the 
sugars and starch in corn.”  Tp many, ethanol seems like a new fuel, but the 
history of ethanol usage in the United States actually began in the nineteenth 
century.  It was first used for lighting purposes, but in 1826 Sam Morey created 
the first engine that could run on ethanol fuel.  Morey’s engine did not run on 
pure ethanol though, and was comprised of a mixture of ethanol and turpentine.  
Despite the exploration into the usage of ethanol as a fuel, its popularity largely 
died off in the 1920s. In the 1920s conventional gasoline became the dominant 
                                                
19 Alternative Fuels & Advanced Vehicles Data Center (2006, April 22). 
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automobile fuel worldwide. Dominance of gasoline is just now starting to end, 
and ethanol is once again gaining popularity.  E85 became defined as an 
alternative fuel under the 1992 U.S. Energy Policy Act, and this largely marks the 
history of the current ethanol-fuel trend.20  
 The attacks by Al-Qaeda on the United States in September 2001 
accelerated the growing trend to find a petroleum alternative.  Presently, the U.S. 
imports over 600,000 thousand barrels of oil per month, and two of its main 
importers are Saudi Arabia and Venezuela-states widely regarded as authoritarian 
and (in quite different ways) not conducive to U.S. interests.  Today in America 
dependence on oil is widely seen as dependence on foreign nations, which has 
increasingly become perceived as dangerous to the American economy and way 
of life.  In his 2006 State of the Union Address President Bush blatantly 
categorized many of the countries that America imports oil from as “unstable,” 
and his Advanced Energy Initiative specifically aimed to end “more than 75 
percent of [American] oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.”  In short, 
Americans are demanding an alternative fuel that is not only clean, but are also 
domestically produced.  E85 is the alternative fuel being pursued in America, not 
just by the American government, but also by American companies.  General 
Motors is one of numerous automobile manufacturers designing engines 
                                                
20 Alternative Fuels & Advanced Vehicles Data Center (2008, April 29). 
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specifically for E85; in fact the company has designed a marketing and 
advertising campaign called, Live Green Go Yellow, that was specifically 
designed to promote E85.21  
 The case for E85 in the United States is two-fold.  First E85 is promoted 
as an environmentally clean and renewable alternative to gasoline.  Proponents of 
E85 argue that this fuel not only reduces GHG emissions, but also reduces 
emissions of particulate matters that have direct affects on human health. 
Additionally, because ethanol is derived as from plants it is advertised as 
renewable, meaning that unlike petroleum it is not a finite resource.  The other 
side of the argument for E85 is economic.  As stated previously, a main plant that 
ethanol is derived from is corn; according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
“Corn is the most widely produced feed grain in the United States.”  There is 
already an established corn agricultural industry in place in the United States, thus 
it is perceived that that the corn industry would be able to produce corn for fuel.22 
In 2000 U.S. farmers earned approximately $246.67 per acre of corn, and with 
around 80 million acres of land being used for corn this industry generated more 
                                                
21 http://www.gm.com/explore/ 
22 The National Corn Growers Association alone represents 32,600 corn farmers 
(Boisen, 2003). 
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than $19 billion in 2000.23  Demand for corn for fuel only effectively increases 
the amount of money a farmer can earn per acre of corn, so many have concluded 
that fuel derived from corn would be beneficial to the American economy. 
Finally, since corn is produced domestically, E85 is hailed as a fuel that will end 
American reliance on foreign nations. The Midwest will grow us out of the 
Middle East. 
 
Part 3: E85 Inefficiencies  
 One of the main critiques against ethanol-based fuel is that its production 
causes a net energy loss.  A net energy loss means that production of the fuel 
requires more energy input than the fuel itself produces as a finished product.  As 
David Pimentel concludes in his article, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance, 
Economics and Environmental Impacts are Negative, 22,119 BTUs of energy are 
lost producing a single gallon of ethanol, in other words one gallon of ethanol 
requires 29% more energy input than it itself yields as a fuel (2003, p. 128).  E85 
creates an overall energy inefficient system.  Even though energy for production 
and energy for combustion occur at different points the cycle of a fuel.  Since in 
                                                
23 It should be noted that this figure does not account for profits earned from corn 
sold as finished food products or profits earned through international trade of 
corn.  
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the U.S. the number of automobiles on the road continually increases, switching 
to reliance on domestically produced E85 would require ever increasing 
production, and this would perpetuate this inefficient energy system.  
 Presently ethanol accounts for only 2% of total fuel consumption in the 
United States, but generating this small amount of fuel requires 3.3 million 
hectares of land (Patzek, 2005, p. 68).  Tad Patzek emphatically states that “even 
if the average net fossil energy ratio were 1.2 for the corn ethanol-cycle, which it 
is not, the entire U.S. corn crop would replace only 2% of the energy in motor 
gasoline” (2006, p. 2).  The conversion of lands into corn fields for E85 has lead 
to issues of food security-choosing corn for fuel or food.  Mexico City erupted in 
protests in 2007 over rising tortilla prices (Malkin, 2007).  The rising tortilla 
prices were attributed to corn-based ethanol driving up the overall cost of corn, 
and rising corn prices were also predicted to drive up the cost of other foods, such 
as meat (Said, 2007).    
 Moreover, E85 cannot be used in engines designed for conventional 
gasoline.  The vast majority of the more than 200 million automobiles already 
operating in the United States are gasoline engines.  Thus, the majority of existing 
vehicles would have to either be converted to flex-fuel engines or be completely 
replaced.  Such a conversion would require both large monetary investments, as 
well as a large amount of time.  It is clear that in terms of both production and 
viability, E85 is simply too inefficient to be a plausible alternative to petroleum. 
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 Part 4: Pollution of a ‘Clean’ Fuel 
 Many proponents of E85 refer to the fuel as an environmentally friendly 
alternative to petroleum; however, both producing and combusting E85 causes 
significant amounts of environmental degradation.  First and foremost, E85 is not 
pure ethanol; it still contains 15% traditional gasoline.  Presently all ethanol based 
fuels contain some percentage of conventional gasoline; thus, any ethanol based 
fuel produces some of the same GHG emissions as conventional gasoline.24  In 
order to fully account for the ecological footprint of E85 the pollution generated 
from its agricultural production must also be accounted for.  The IPCC’s 2007 
Summery for Policymakers concludes that global emissions of methane are very 
likely due to agriculture, and that nitrous oxide emissions are defiantly due to 
agriculture.  Switching from gasoline to E85 would not end emissions causing 
climate change: it would largely only shift the site of these emissions from fuel 
combustion to fuel production.  In 2000, the nine top corn-producing states, 
known as the Corn Belt, used more than one-hundred thousand pounds of 
herbicides and close to ten-thousand pounds of insecticides in the production of 
corn alone (Graboski, 2002).  The usage of insecticides and herbicides can have 
                                                
24 See Dias de Oliveira (2005) for specific amounts of CO2 emitted from E85 
production.  
38 
 
direct impacts on the health of those who handle them; epidemiological studies 
have shown that the use of these products can cause a variety of cancers (Blair, p. 
206).  In a study of how pesticides, which is the larger classification for herbicides 
and insecticides, affect aquatic life researcher Rick Relyea found that 3 out of 4 
common pesticides examined led to a reduction of species richness (2004).  
Relyea additionally concluded that the usage of Roundup®, a common herbicide 
used on corn fields, reduced species richness by 22% (2004).25
 Uses of fertilizers in agriculture, the most common of which are nitrogen 
and phosphorous, also have numerous environmental effects. In 2001 U.S. corn 
farmers used a combined 9 billion pounds of nitrogen and 3 billion pounds of 
phosphorous (Patzek, p. 321).  Fertilizer usage alone accounts for 90% of global 
nitrous oxide emissions (Ayoub, 1999, p. 119).  The global warming potential for 
nitrous oxide is 180 times that of CO2, and  methane is 10 times larger than CO2 
(Lashof, 1990, p. 530).  Thus, substituting gasoline with E85 would not minimize 
emissions nor would it prevent further climate change.  Also for both freshwater 
and saltwater, the agricultural runoff of fertilizers can cause dead zones, 
                                                
25 A specific type of corn that is used in conjunction with Roundup® was created 
to be jointly used with it Roundup®, Roundup Ready Corn®. In 1998 900,000 
acres in the United States were planted with Roundup Ready Corn®, which 
means that Roundup® was applied to at least 900,000 acres of land. 
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eutrophication, and an overall loss in biodiversity.  It is clear that current corn 
agricultural practices in the United States contribute to significant amounts of 
environmental degradation, and the conversion from gasoline to E85 would only 
exacerbate this degradation.  
  Converting the corn feedstock into ethanol presents another array of 
environmental problems.  The conversion of feedstock into ethanol requires the 
usage of methane, oil, and coal, and the usage of all three directly release GHG.  
There are two different processes that convert corn into ethanol: dry mill and wet 
mill.  The wet mill process requires more capital and the input of more energy, 
thus the dry mill process is more commonly practiced (Graboski, 2002).  Both 
methods require a fermentation process.  Fermentation requires some form of a 
nitrogen source, often ammonium sulfate or urea.  Usages of these forms of 
nitrogen in the production of ethanol have their own potential environmental 
impacts, acid rain for example (World Bank, 1998).  However, the manufacturing 
of ammonium sulfate and urea yields additional environmental impacts; industrial 
plants that produce ammonia emit CO2, nitrous oxide, and sulfur dioxide (World 
Bank, 1998).  Additionally, the production of ammonium sulfate and urea causes 
the release of significant levels of particulate matter, which can have direct 
impacts on human health and are non-point sources of air pollution (World Bank, 
1998).  
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In sum, when evaluating the life-cycle of ethanol production, it is evident 
that significant amounts of GHG are released.  However, emissions do not end 
with ethanol production; the authors of Emissions of Nitrous Oxide and Methane 
from Conventional and Alternative Fuel Motor Vehicles examined emissions of 
nitrous oxide and methane from a variety of automobiles, and found that, 
“…methane emissions tend to increase with ethanol content” (2002, p.500). They 
also state that “Virtually all [alternative fuel vehicles] built or constructed to date 
use stock gasoline-vehicle catalytic control systems (or systems very similar to 
gasoline systems), and emit as much nitrous oxide as do gasoline vehicles” (2002, 
p.492).  While E85 may reduce CO2 emissions it will emit as much, if not more, 
methane and nitrous oxide than conventional gasoline in combustion alone. 
 In order to analyze the full environmental impacts of E85, several more 
factors need to be considered.  Water demand is a serious concern.  The irrigation 
of corn fields requires significant amounts of freshwater; about 30% of irrigation 
water drawn from ground water comes from one source, the Ogallala aquifer 
(Rosenberg, 1999, p. 677).  The Ogallala aquifer is also a significant source of 
freshwater used for human intake, and with global climate change projected to 
diminish the amounts of available freshwater, irrigation practices should be 
minimized (Rosenberg, 1999).  Freshwater is also required in both the wet and 
dry mill processes. One bushel of corn requires 35 gallons of freshwater, and 
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yields ~2.7 gallons of ethanol.  In 2004 approximately 3,251,881,00026 barrels of 
conventional gasoline were used, and since the current energy ratio of ethanol to 
gasoline is 1.42, to meet this fuel demand close to 5 billion gallons of E85 would 
be needed.  In terms of freshwater, this means that roughly 65 billion gallons of 
freshwater per year would be used in just the manufacturing of E85.  If climate 
change reduces the availability of freshwater, which is a widely accepted belief, it 
may not be possible or acceptable to use such amounts of water for fuel 
production.  Finally, E85 is corrosive and cannot be transported using the current 
pipeline network that is used to transport petroleum in the United States.  
Transportation of E85 would have to be done by either truck or train, and this 
would only increase fuel usage, perpetuating the cycle of environmental damage.  
Conversion of cars, the disposal of conventional vehicles to vehicles capable of 
using E85, alone would generate significant amounts of  CO2 (Kim, 2005).  .  
Even if E85 was clean, which clearly it is not, conversion to an E85 automobile 
society would produce large amounts of inorganic waste. 
 
Part 4: A Look to the Future from the Past 
 The case study of E85 demonstrates that substituting petroleum with an 
alternative fuel only shifts environmental degradation associated with automobile 
use.  Researchers Erling Holden and Karl Georg Høyer analyzed the ecological 
                                                
26 From EIA’s estimated petroleum consumption.  
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impact of 16 different fuels and found that hydropower was the least 
environmentally damaging, and was thus, the best alternative to petroleum. 
However, the researchers were quick to point out that hydropower is “not a global 
resource with sufficient volumes to support the ever increasing transport systems” 
(2005, p. 402).  It is clear that an alternative fuel is not in fact the solution to 
environmental degradation associated with petroleum.  Pollution generated from 
petroleum is only a symptom of a larger problem: continual and ever-growing 
transportation consumption.  
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
The connection between continual transportation consumption and 
environmental degradation is hardly new.  Walker and Large articulated this very 
connection in 1974 in their paper titled The Economics of Energy Extravagance.   
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Despite this, the same practices that Walker and Large identified as encouraging 
and perpetuating transportation are still in existence.  President Bush’s 2006 
Presidential Address only confirms that transportation consumption will only 
grow in the future; the energy plan that Bush outlined largely relies on technology 
to minimize environmental damage and to end dependence on ‘unstable’ nations.  
Bush’s plan does not attempt to minimize transportation consumption; it seeks to 
find an alternative fuel specifically so reliance on automobiles can continue.  
There is a long history of U.S. transportation policy advocating expansion of 
transportation consumption. Walker and Large cite transportation consumption as 
a vital part of American society, and history provides evidence of this.  In his 
1956 State of the Union Address President Eisenhower directly called for the 
construction of “a modern, interstate highway system.”  The passage of the 
Federal Aid Highway Act in 1956 helped enable the construction of much of 
today’s highway system; this helped lay the foundation of a society dependent on 
automobile use.  More recently the spending of billions of dollars on the 
development of alternative energies indicates that transportation consumption is 
only being encouraged. 
 Since transportation consumption has been recognized as problematic for 
at least 30 years, there must be a more complex reason behind the continual 
environmental degradation associated with petroleum.  The global economy can 
be cited as an overarching reason for the continuation of this problem.  The global 
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economy is fundamentally capitalist, and the U.S. is a principal economic power 
in this system.  As a capitalist nation, operating under neoliberal principals, an 
underlying belief guiding American society is that consumption is not only 
morally good, but a good-a commodity, in effect-best left to individual choice. 
Implementing regulations and controls that would reduce transportation 
consumption would violate a crucial tenant of capitalism: the avoidance of an 
economic crisis.  In the years since Walker and Large first wrote their paper 
advances in technologies have taken place, and more scientific knowledge about 
the effects of GHG has been generated and spread to the public; yet, GHG 
emissions have only increased. 
 According to the IPCC, humanity is facing unprecedented climate change-
with negative consequences for humanity caused by glacier melt, rising 
temperatures, loss of freshwater, and so on.  Despite all the evidence that 
American society must dramatically transform, no new path has been created.  
The U.S. is caught in set of contradictions.  Current socio-economic behavior is 
contributing to massive, unprecedented environmental damage, impacts of which 
are largely perceived to be devastating and result in massive losses of life.  Yet, 
no serious attempts to correct our collective problems have been proposed.  The 
famous economist John Maynard Keynes once wrote: “There is no evidence from 
experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides 
with that which is most profitable.”  In 2007 the combined profits for Exxon 
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Mobile, Chevron and Conco Philips soared well above $70 billion; it is clear 
which investment policy America values (Fortune, 2007, p. 226).27
The inability of American society to limit transportation consumption 
despite all of its negative impacts seems proof that Keynes statement rings true. 
Perhaps only the effects of climate change can force the change that would limit 
American transportation consumption.  But by that time it may simply be too late.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 Profits were up 2.8% for Exxon and 9% for Chevron from 2006. 
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Chapter 3 
 Theorizing the Contradictions: A Green-Marxist Analysis 
“We cannot sustain earth’s life-support system within the present 
economic systems.”-Robert Newman, The Guardian 
 
 
Part 1: Capitalism and Kyoto 
The case studies on Nigeria and the United States demonstrate the 
necessity for states world-wide to address the current problem.  However, it has 
become clear that addressing this problem must be a global effort.  A global 
solution means that states must act together, which has proven to be difficult and 
coordination has not yield positive results.  The Kyoto Protocol presents insights 
into present contradictions and the future under climate change may prove 
Newman prove to be correct. 
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce GHG emissions, and cap-
and-trade is the method in which these emissions are to be reduced.  The term 
cap-and-trade refers to the usage of neoliberal policy in the mitigation and 
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reduction of emissions.  The U.S. initiated the first cap-and-trade program in 1990 
under President George H. Bush; the 1990 Clean Air Act sought to reduce ozone 
depletion and address issues of national air quality.  According to the EPA, the 
1990 Clean Air Act, “encourage[d] the use of market-based principles and other 
innovative approaches, like performance-based standards and emission banking 
and trading.”28  In cap-and-trade programs, a specific quantity is set as the limit 
for allowable emissions of a particular pollutant, and this is referred to as the 
“cap”.29  The EPA defines an allowance as “an authorization to emit a fixed 
amount of a pollutant” (Ibid).  The allowances based on the 1990 Clean Air Act 
are used by individual firms or industries, whereas allowances in the Kyoto 
Protocol are used by countries. 
The overall goal of the Kyoto Protocol is for member countries to 
collectively reduce GHG emissions by ~5% of 1990 emissions by 2012.  The 
foundation of Kyoto’s design was the phrase “common but differentiated 
responsibilities;” this phrase essentially exonerated peripheral countries from 
having GHG limits.30  Kyoto has three provisions that provide “a certain degree of 
flexibility” for countries to meet the 2012 goal (Ibid).  The three provisions are: 
                                                
28 http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/peg/index.html 
29 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/cap-trade/index.html 
30 http://UNFCCCc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Joint 
Implementation. Emissions Trading is a program to facilitate the buying and 
selling of GHG allowances among Annex 1 members (Ibid). 31  The Clean 
Development Mechanism is an offset trading system to assist trading between 
developed and peripheral countries; essentially a developed country would 
purchase offsets from one or several peripheral countries (Ibid).  Similarly to the 
set-up of the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation aims to 
transfer advanced technologies from developed to peripheral countries; it is a 
system in which a donor country invests in pollution reduction measures in a host 
country, and in return the donor country would receive allowances to use for its 
own emissions targets (Ibid).  
 
Part 2: Limits and Failures of Kyoto 
In 2001 President Bush stated that the United States would not sign the 
Kyoto Protocol, effectively ending the country’s participation in the global effort 
to address climate change.  The unwillingness of United States to sign Kyoto was 
a shock to the international community.  Since the U.S. has been the greatest 
                                                
31 Annex I countries are countries that have specified GHG emissions targets, and 
who have been the biggest emitters of GHG. In general, they are wealthy 
industrial nations.   
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contributor of GHG emissions its withdrawal from participation was seen as a 
severe failure for Kyoto; in 2004 the U.S. accounted for 24.3% of global CO2 
emissions (Marland, 2007).32  However, since 2001 it has been argued that the 
actions of the United States actually helped accelerate the implementation of 
Kyoto, and ultimately strengthened it.  I argue that Kyoto’s ultimate failure lies 
not with the U.S. withdrawal and China’s exemption, but in the design it uses to 
reduce GHG emissions, specifically cap-and-trade.  Cap-and-trade programs are 
neoliberal policies. However, by and large neoliberal development polices have 
not yielded developmental progress in peripheral countries; nor have they 
improved the quality of life for those living in abject poverty.  The case study of 
chapter 1 provides much evidence of this.  Neoliberal economics have lead to 
greater socioeconomic stratification both within and between countries (Wade, 
2004).  This socioeconomic stratification heightens societal conflict and has 
further complicated the prospect for a global reduction of GHG.  
The consequences of using neoliberal policies to mitigate emissions can be 
highlighted through an analysis of offsets.  An offset is a method to 
counterbalance emissions that exceed a cap.  In terms of a cap-and-trade program, 
instead of purchasing an allowance an offset could be purchased.  Offsets function 
                                                
32  In 2007, from petroleum usage alone America emitted 2.6 billion metric tons of 
CO2 (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/greenhouse_gas.cfm). 
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by having emissions above a limit in one location be compensated for by either 
non-emissions or an emissions reduction measure, like sequestration, in another 
location.  For the Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism means that 
wealthy, industrial countries will be able to purchase offsets to mitigate their own 
emissions, meaning that non-emissions by peripheral countries are in the interest 
of wealthy countries.  The Clean Development Mechanism merely perpetuates 
uneven relations and creates incentive for developed nations to stifle 
developmental, specifically energy, progress in peripheral ones.  It is also 
important to note that offsets do not ensure that emissions are actually reduced; 
they only aim to prevent an increase in total emissions.  The IPCC expressed that 
mitigation of emissions will not prevent the impacts of climate change (2007).  
Like offsets, cap-and-trade programs are only mechanisms to reduce 
emissions; they do not ensure that reductions will occur at all.  Here, the Kyoto 
Protocol has failed to reduce world-wide GHG emissions.  It has not only failed to 
reduce them, but has not even been able to mitigate them; the IPCC stated in 2007 
that GHG emissions will have risen by between 25 and 90 per cent by 2030 (U.N. 
report, 2007).  Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayer reiterated this point by writing in 
Nature that “On present trends, for another 20 years, the world will continue 
installing carbon-intensive infrastructure, such as coal power plants… (2007, p. 
974).”  Furthermore, most Annex I member will not meet their Kyoto Protocol 
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emissions targets.33  The failure, due perhaps by sheer unwillingness, of the 
industrial countries to reduce their GHG emissions has also had geo-political 
ramifications; this failure is cited as the reason why China and India are already 
demonstrating that they will refuse to sign any pact that replaces Kyoto in 2012 if 
it binds them to emissions targets (Adam, 2008).34  The economic competition, 
which is has been intensifying, between the United States and China means that if 
China does not sign onto the agreement the agreement will likely be rejected by 
the United States Congress (Adams, 2008).  Indeed, the perceived negative impact 
that Kyoto would have had on America’s economy was the main reason the 
United States pulled out of the negotiations to begin with.  In 2001, when 
discussing the United States withdrawal, then White House Spokesmen Ari 
Fleischer told the press that, “[President Bush] does not support the Kyoto treaty. 
It is not in the United States’ economic best interest (The Associated Press, 
2001).”  Kyoto was not just unfavorable to President Bush though, prior to the 
agreement even being reached the U.S. senate passed a resolution by a vote of 95-
0 that was essentially a preemptive rejection of Kyoto (The Associated Press, 
2001).  The failures of Kyoto should indicate that neoliberal policies are wholly 
                                                
33 Out of 15 European Union Nations who are Annex 1 members, 10 are failing 
short of meeting their Kyoto targets, and several haven even had their GHG 
emissions rise (Daly, 2003). 
34 China has now become the world’s number one producer of carbon. CITE 
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inadequate to address the global problem.  Furthermore, the conflict between 
addressing the global problem and economic growth clearly demonstrates that 
global capitalism is itself problematic.  
 
Part 2: Critiquing Capitalism and Valuing Nature 
 The discipline of ecology dictates that species are bound to a carrying 
capacity, meaning that growth, specifically in this context population growth, is a 
limited process.35  Similarly, the growth of an actual organism is also a fixed 
process that takes place between birth and death.  In stark contrast, economic 
discourse perceives that it is possible to have gross world product continually 
grow at 3-4% per year; the underlying assumption here is that economic growth is 
infinite.  As of January, 2008, seven major pieces of climate change legislation 
had been introduced into the United States Congress.  All seven are cap-and-trade 
programs, adhere to the belief that economic growth is infinite, and additionally 
express that economic growth is a national priority.  Based on these, the premises 
that for a piece of legislation to be successful, it must allow for continual 
                                                
35 While there is widespread debate about whether or not humans are bound by a 
carrying capacity, this paper is not addressing this argument. I am using the 
ecological concept of carrying capacity merely to demonstrate the scientific 
acceptance of finite growth.   
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economic growth and should have a minimal, if any, negative impact on the 
economy can be assumed.  United States Senator Norm Coleman had this to say 
in regards to American climate change policy: 
It is imperative that our nation acts now to address the concerns over 
growing greenhouse gas emissions, while carefully addressing the effects 
it could have on working families and our economy. The Lieberman-
Warner America’s Climate Security Act meets this need by taking a 
responsible approach to greenhouse gas reduction that will not undermine 
our economy[emphasis added] (Sawicki, 2007). 
Even if economic growth itself is not bound to a carrying capacity, the 
problem arises that capitalism is based on continual accumulation and expansion 
(Marx, 1867).36   Accumulation and expansion entail the usage and consumption 
of nature-expansion into new territories or the usage of fossil fuels to name but a 
few examples.  Technology has been widely viewed as a way to overcome 
supposed natural limits; in other words technology allows the triumph of man 
over nature. But in terms of finite resources, such as oil, technology can only 
prolong and/or manipulate the usage of these resources; it cannot create them.  
Furthermore, the projected effects of climate change-in spite of advancements in 
                                                
36 This is based on the accumulation process and cycle of capital, famously put 
forth by Marx as money-commodity-money (M-C-M'). 
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oil extraction and automobile engines-indicate that technology does not prevent 
natural disasters or environmental problems.37  To fully realize the limitations of 
technology, one only needs to recall the catastrophic failures of the levees and 
massive loss of life that occurred during Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.38
 Examining how nature is valued under capitalism further draws out the 
complexities for addressing the current problem.  Existing and proposed climate 
change polices only alter the monetary valuation of nature and seek to correctly 
‘price’ GHG emissions.  This is inherently problematic for several reasons.  One 
is getting the correct price; however, this problem circumvents larger dilemmas. 
The money form itself is problematic. Money is supposed to reflect a 
commodities value, but as Marx states:  
“Money, like every other commodity, cannot express the magnitude of its 
value except relatively in other commodities. This value is determined by 
the labour-time required for its production…” (1990, p.186).   
In other words money does not reflect the use-value of a commodity, but produces 
value and surplus-value (Karatani, 2005, p. 268).  As Marx famously pointed out 
in Capital Volume 1, surplus-value is nothing more than exploited labor-power, or 
                                                
37 For information about projected effects see the IPCC website. 
38 The total number of persons dead or missing from Hurricane Katrina is 1,889 
(http://www.katrinalist.columbia.edu/stats.php). 
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for the purposes of this thesis, the exploitation of nature (1990, see chapter 9).  
This then leads to the quandaries of how outside the money-form nature can be 
valued, and whether or not nature is inherently valuable.  As David Harvey points 
out though, “the choice of values lies within us, [meaning society], and not in 
nature” (1996, p. 163).39    
Valuation of nature stems from a dualism of man and nature.  The 
separation of humanity from nature is the foundation for the underlying and 
hegemonic belief that society and the environment ultimately conflict with each 
other and that only one can prevail. This belief is explicit in the dominant 
attitudes of ecocentrism and technocentrism, which utterly conflict with one 
                                                
39 The history of national parks sheds light onto how nature is being valued. In the 
United States, national parks were born out of two distinct perspectives: the 
sublime and the frontier (see Cronon, 1995 and Williams, 1976). The sublime 
entails the preservation of an area based on society’s romanticism of that 
particular site, and this romanticism is often tied to religious overtones: The 
Grand Canyon for example. From the frontier perspective, an area would be 
preserved in order to prevent its destruction or usage by humans: Yosemite is an 
example. Both perspectives implicitly involve the perception that humanity is 
separate from nature, and that to preserve nature human use of that space must be 
minimized, regulated, controlled, or completely prevented. 
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another and create divergent social groups (Castree, 2005).  This dualism of 
humanity and nature puts for the notion that society must choose between 
preserving the environment and preserving the global economy, which ultimately 
is seen as preserving humanity. In The Magical State, Fernando Coronil writes:  
The worldwide expansion of capitalism and the creation of a global 
market of commodities has been driven by the profit-seeking effort to 
control not only cheap labor, technology or markets, but also nature (1997, 
p. 30).   
Coronil’s statement demonstrates not only the dualism of humanity and nature, 
but that the motivation behind this dualism and the ‘domination’ of man over 
nature is purely capitalist.  Thus, using capitalist means to address the global 
problem is not at all for the purpose of mitigating environmental damage or even 
avoiding loss of human life.  It is for the preservation of capitalism itself.   A 
troubling example of this is provided by the conflict in the Niger Delta.  Conflict 
in this region that suspends oil production helps to drive-up oil prices world-wide, 
which leads to larger profits for transnational oil corporations (Zalik, 2004, p. 
419).  The interest of these transnational corporations demonstrates that under 
capitalism, profit is valued above all, even human life.  Capitalism’s valuation of 
nature is not solely an environmental issue: it is also an ethical one.  
Coronil comments on the human-nature relation that “human beings are a 
part of nature whose human nature is transformed by acting upon external nature” 
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(1997, p. 27).  What is vital of Coronil’s statement is the recognition that the 
transformation into an oil intensive society is a transformation of human nature 
itself.  Meaning that addressing the global problem means that humanity must 
also transform itself into a post-oil society, not merely substitute oil with an 
alternative or become consciousness-consumers.  
 
Part 3: Ethical States or State Ethics? 
 The green-Marxist critique of capitalism’s valuation of nature is limited 
though because it does not provide insight into why these critiques are not being 
incorporated into discourses on the global problem.  However, the above section 
demonstrates that societal valuation lies at the root of the current problem.  This 
sentiment is explicitly articulated by Al Gore’s statement that climate change is 
not “a political issue, [but]… a moral issue.”  This claim leads to the conclusion 
that altruism can solve the global problem: that individuals need to choose to emit 
less GHG.40  The failures of Kyoto clearly demonstrate that nobody is choosing 
this.  
                                                
40 This freedom of choice is tied to the ideology of capitalist societies: “both buyer 
and seller of a commodity, say of labor-power, are constrained only by their free 
will” (Marx, quoted in Jessop, 2002, p. 455). 
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Yet, individual choices are constricted by social classes and social 
institutions.  These form the foundation of the state, and thus, both figuratively 
and literally govern everyday life.  The reality of the choice to drive less for 
Americans living in suburbs, which is nearly impossible, is an example of the 
governance of choice.  Thus, to understand why there is a global failure to 
adequately address the current problem, a critique of the State is also needed. 
Antonio Gramci’s concept of hegemony illuminates why states are wholly unable 
to address or even acknowledge the problems of capitalist growth.  Writing in his 
prison notebooks, Gramsci argues that force and coercion alone cannot account 
for the dominance of capitalism, and that an analysis of hegemony is needed to 
explain this dominance (1971).  This type of hegemony is achieved through what 
Gramsci argues as the “naturalization” of bourgeoisie values to society at large 
(1971).   Bob Jessop, drawing on Gramsci, presents the concept of economic 
hegemony in his book State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place 
(1990).  Economic hegemony is the acceptance of a particular accumulation 
strategy, and this acceptance provides what Jessop writes as “a stable framework 
within which competition and conflicting interests can be conducted without 
disturbing the overall unity of the circuit of capital” (1990, p. 199).  The 
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that current failures to address the 
global problem are due to a particular form of hegemony.   
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The global economy is a product of capitalism, and is currently operating 
under neoliberal principals. Capitalist states are the largest integrative force, 
meaning that they are the dominate powers globally, and capitalism is their 
binding agreement.  As Karatani states “no matter how social democratic the state 
appears within itself, it is hegemonic to its exteriority” (2005, p. 275).  Since 
capitalism is what binds these states together, it is illogical and irrational for them 
to accept that capitalism is ineffective and detrimental for addressing the global 
problem.  If this were somehow to occur, global hegemony would break down.  If 
such a break down were to occur, reaching a global solution for addressing the 
current problem would be highly improbable, perhaps impossible.  However, this 
does not mean that the global problem would not or could not be addressed; it 
only means that it unlikely to occur in the form of a coordinated global effort.  
The global problem is a complex and multifaceted one facing humanity. 
This thesis has argued that capitalism has both produced the global problem and 
prevented it from being dealt with.  Perhaps Al Gore is correct in stating that 
climate change, and more broadly the global problem, is a moral, and not a 
political issue.  Thus, the global problem is not an environmental or even 
economic issue.  Rather it is an ethical problem that encompasses all of these 
issues.  In the final chapter of Transcritique, Kojin Karatani writes that, 
“Revolution [against capitalism] is a practical problem. And this practical 
problem must be interpreted in the Kantian sense: the movement against 
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capitalism is an ethical and moral one.”  The crucial conclusion that can be drawn 
is that the task before humanity is to manage the global problem both outside the 
state and capitalism.  
 
Critical Reflections: 
 The ultimate conclusion that I draw-that the global problem is a question 
of ethics that must be dealt with outside the State and capitalism-is both 
unsatisfactory and problematic to me.  On the one hand, the predicted effects of 
climate change have the potential to destroy humanity, but globalizing ethics 
seems to be just as dangerous.  Whose ethics will be accepted as the global norm?  
And how can non-capitalist ethics become globalized given capitalisms 
integrative force?  To me it seems like society is locked in a paradoxical situation.  
For me this brings up two larger questions: Can capitalist societies transform 
ethics without some monumental disaster forcing this shift?  And, as a person who 
has grown up in a capitalist society can I even conceive of what the ethics of a 
non-capitalist society would be?  These questions lead me to a quote by Karl 
Marx. 
No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for 
which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of 
production never replace older ones before the material conditions for 
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their existence have matured within the framework of the old society 
(Marx, 1859). 
This is not to suggest that Marx's view on class struggle as the means to 
destruction is correct, but rather that destruction might be the path towards a 
different set of ethics. As a human being, Marx’s quote is unsettling because it 
entails the acceptance of destruction, which in the face of climate change is the 
acceptance of massive loss of life. However, I am ultimately left with another 
quote: “So we might gesture towards the next moment by asking not how to think, 
but what to think about” (Peet & Watts, 2004, preface).  Perhaps I can only 
“gesture to the next moment” by putting forth the idea that society needs to shift 
from discourses of environment and economics to one of ethics. 
.
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